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Calculation Cover Sheet The purpose of this calculation is to determine the (insite and offsite dose consequences resulting from a fire in a contaminated area. 
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
.
8.
9.
Is 
Input:
Unit Liter Doses (ULD) for aging waste are given below in Table 2 
Assumptions:
It is assumed that the material at risk s bounded by a 1 inch deep layer of dried out aging waste material on the floor of a valve pic around the drain. This is based on the observation that the lip of the drain may protrude a! much as 1 inch above the floor in some pits. A typical valve pit was chosen because it is larger than the other types of pits that may contain contaminated material.
vol% AWF solids. This is bounding f(a all possible Hanford waste transfers [Ref. 31
Waste composition is assumed to be 57 vol% Aging Waste Facility (AWF) liquids and It is assumed that all of the hazardou! material is available to be released during the fire and that the resuspension of any hazardoils material left at the bottom of the pit as a result of the fire is negligible. This is a reasonable assumption since resuspension rate from the floor of a pit several feet below ground would be several orders of magnitude below the suspension rate due to thermal stress [Ref.
21.
For purposes of calculating radiologic,iI dose consequences, the fire is assumed to last for , C I~ than 2 hours. This means that ttle more conservative annual average integrated atmospheric dispersion coefficient xlQ' without plume meander is used to calculate dose The ARF x RF for liquid UNH under a gasoline fire with a 1 m/s wind is about a iactor of 3 greater than the ARF x RF for powders.. This accident, however, will most liksly involve the release of particulate from a contaminated surface rather then from a t'oiling liquid. For this reason the assumed ARF x RF value for noncombustible powders is bt:lieved to be sufficently conservative. 51. Since the risk acceptance guideline is stated in 15 minute averages, it was consewately assumed that all of the combustible m~terial was consumed and released in the first 15 minutes of the fire.
A crane or a support vehicle travels ne) more than 150 m per day close enough to a pit for fuel from a ruptured fuel tank to flow iiito the pit. An assumption regarding the distance traveled by vehicles in an around pits is required in order to estimate an accident frequency.
Analytical Methods and Calculations:
The analyzed accident bounds the consequences for any of the hazards associated with fires in contaminated areas. The accident scensrio assumes a 1 inch layer of dried out waste in the form of a powdery residue on the bottom of a valve pit. Fuel spills into the pit from a ruptured fuel tank and ignites. Both rad oactive and toxic particulates are released to the atmosphere as influenced by the fire. Dose consequences were calculated using the methods given in Ref. 1 for the release of both radioactive and toxic materials.
Airborne Source Term
The determination of the airborne source tmn follows that of Equation 
Fire in a Contaminated Area
For aerodynamic entrainment/resuspensicn events, the airborne release rate (ARR) is given. It is multiplied by the time that tne hazardous material is subjected to the entrainment/resuspension mechanism to cbtain the ARF. The source material for this accident was issumed to be AWF waste composed of 33 vol% solids and 67 vol% liquids. Therefore, usirg the ULDs for AWF liquids and solids given in Table 2 gives Toxicological dose consequences were callxiated using the sum-of-fractions method of Ref, 1. In this method the released quantify is riultiplied by the ARR and then multiplied by the appropriate value for 
WHC-SO
The toxicological dose consequence are th: collision Therefore, the unmitigated event frequenc] for a fire in a pit due to a collision with a pit curb is estimated to be
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Results:
The results of the calculations are given n Table 6 . The radiological results are well within risk evaluation guidelines for offsite rece )tors but over the risk evaluation guidelines for an onsite receptor for an anticipated event.
The toxicological dose consequence results are well within the guidelines for both onsite and offsite receptors. 
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For an offsite receptor the calculated dose consequences are well within the risk evaluation guidelines. However, for an onsite receplor the calculated radiological dose is above the risk guidelines for an anticipated event. Tht: calculations are very sensitive to the amount of material at risk and to the ARF x RF valiies used in the calculations. The values assumed for these quantities are believed to be suffici mtly conservative; however, not enough confidence can be placed in these values to ensure thit the release will remain within the calculated bin.
On the other hand, the accident freqiiency analysis performed above shows that the probability for this fire is "beyond extre nely unlikely" using the assumed miles of vehicle travel near pits. Since the margin of e r a r to remain in at least the "extremely unlikely"
category is over 2 orders of magnituce, the consequences of this accident should be considered to be within the risk guideline!.
The following Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) and Defense in Depth controls are recommend to prevent this accident. Thesi: TSRs will further reduce the accident frequency.
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Fire in a Contaminated Area (1) The material at risk in lhis accident is bounded by I 1 in layer of waste at the bottom of a typical valve pit. The typical pit is 10 ft by 12 ff with a drain in OM comer. The dra n may have a 1 in lip above h e floor that could cause waste from a leak 10 stagnant in the pit up to a depth of 1 inch at the drain. The floor of the pit slopes towards the drain from all sides of the pit. The floor elevation at the walls of the pit is I..) inches above the drain. Based on this fact the volume of waste is bounded by 5 f t ' .
(2) The composition of waste is 67 percent AWF liquiils and 33 percent AWF solids. 
